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Capital and the Debt Trap
''Capital and the Debt Trap'' is a research monograph by Claudia Sanchez Bajo〔(【引用サイトリンク】title= Claudia Sanchez Bajo )〕 and Bruno Roelants. The first four chapters provide a general summary of the current international economic instability, noting that cooperatives have on average performed better than traditional for-profit corporations. The next four chapters describe four different cooperatives in four different countries. The final chapter provides a summary. Cooperatives seem on average to last longer and be more responsive to the needs of customers and the communities in which they operate, because their shared ownership and participative management generally makes labor more flexible while reducing the incentives of upper management to maximize short-term performance at the expense of the long term.
==The 2007–2012 global economic crisis and cooperatives==
The 2007–2012 global economic crisis is described as "The Mother of All Crises" with substantial wealth destruction for most people (ch. 1). The causes are attributed in part to three traps: consumption, liquidity and debt (ch. 2). Another contributor is the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations (ch. 3). This separation creates perverse incentives for senior managers to do things in their own short-term interests at the expense of the performance of their companies, stockholders, employees, and the communities in which they operate. This is particularly true when senior executives can make millions of dollars in based on the short-term performance of their companies without having to return that money if the company subsequently fails due to behavior that is short sighted at best and often fraudulent. In many cases, this includes corruption in government described in ''Republic, Lost''. This corruption has led to substantial deregulation of many industries, especially finance, which even extended to the "de facto decriminalization of elite financial fraud," in the words of William K. Black. Black was a lead litigator during the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis of 20–25 years ago. As that crisis was building between 1980 and 1989, leading industry executives like Charles Keating spent lavishly on political campaign contributions. They were able to translate those contributions into actions by politicians that prevented regulators from filing criminal referrals. After the collapse of Ponzi schemes run by executives like Keating, regulators were finally allowed to investigate seriously and file thousands of criminal referrals
that led to over a thousand criminal convictions of key S&L insiders. Black insists that the 2007–2012 global economic crisis is roughly 70 times worse than the S&L crisis. However, in the current crisis, regulators have yet (as of late 2012) to file substantive criminal referrals in spite of substantive evidence of massive fraud by leading finance industry executives and the organizations they controlled.
Cooperatives, by contrast, have fewer problems with perverse incentives, because their ownership and control structures follow legal mandates promoted by the International Co-operative Alliance. These generally involve many more people in critical decisions (ch. 4). "()ooperatives tend to have a longer life than other types of enterprise, and thus a higher level of entrepreneurial sustainability. In (study ), the rate of survival of cooperatives after three years was 75 percent, whereas it was only 48 percent for all enterprises ... () after ten years, 44 percent of cooperatives were still in operation, whereas the ratio was only 20 percent for all enterprises." (p. 109)
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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